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14.1 Introduction
It has long been recognized that “pure” ﬂoating exchange rate regimes
(deﬁned as regimes in which the monetary authority does not intervene at
all in foreign exchange markets) have rarely—if ever—existed in practice.
More surprising, however, is the extent to which developing countries
(which claim to be ﬂoaters) are reluctant to let the nominal exchange rate
ﬂuctuate in response to shocks, as convincingly documented by Calvo and
Reinhart (2000a).1 To assess this phenomenon, consider, as a benchmark
for a relatively pure ﬂoater, the cases of the United States and Japan. As in-
dicated in table 14.1, the probability that the monthly variation in the nom-
inal exchange rate falls within a  2.5 percent band is 58.7 percent for the
United States and 61.2 percent for Japan. In contrast, for developing coun-
tries classiﬁed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as free ﬂoaters
(FL) or managed ﬂoaters(MF), the average probability is 77.4 percent. This
is even more remarkable considering that one would conjecture that devel-
oping countries are subject to larger and more frequent shocks.2 Thus, the
14
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.revealed preference for smoothing out exchange rate ﬂuctuations—or “fear
of ﬂoating”—is nothing short of remarkable.
How do emerging countries smooth out exchange rate ﬂuctuations in
practice? Not surprisingly, they do so by actively intervening in foreign ex-
change markets and engaging in an active interest rate defense of the cur-
rency. Again, for the United States and Japan, the probability that the
monthly variation in international reserves falls within a  2.5 percent band
is 62.2 percent and 74.3 percent, respectively. The corresponding average
for developing countries is 35.0 percent, indicating a much larger variabil-
ity in international reserves. Similarly, the probability that the monthly vari-
ation in nominal interest rates falls in a  25 basis point band is 59.7 percent
for the United States and 67.9 percent for Japan. The corresponding ﬁgure
for emerging countries is 28.4 percent, suggesting a much more active in-
terest rate defense of the currency.
In addition, based on contemporaneous correlations among residuals
from a vector autoregression analysis for individual episodes, Calvo and
Reinhart (2000a) conclude that, in most instances, (a) the correlation be-
tween the exchange rate and interest rates is positive, (b) the correlation be-
tween reserves and the exchange rate is negative, and (c) the correlation
between interest rates and reserves is negative. All three correlations seem
to be consistent with the overall story told by table 14.1.
This paper starts from the presumption that the policies just described re-
ﬂect an optimal policy response to underlying shocks.3 In this light, this ex-
treme fear of ﬂoating is puzzling because, even if nominal exchange rate ﬂuc-
tuations were costly, one would expect a monotonic relationship between
nominal exchange rate variability and the size of the underlying shock (i.e.,
the larger the shocks, the larger the nominal exchange rate variability). At
best, costly exchange rate ﬂuctuations would explain a departure from a pure
ﬂoating but would not explain the fact that countries subject to larger shocks
have less volatile exchange rates, as suggested by the data.
The theoretical challenge is thus to build a simple model that allows for an
explicit welfare evaluation of alternative policies and analyze whether the
optimal policy in the model roughly replicates the observed policies. This pa-
per represents a ﬁrst eﬀort on our part to tackle this important question.4We
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private consumption is between three and four times more volatile (as shown by Talvi and
Végh 2000, based on Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered data for 1970–94).
3. We consider the main alternative hypothesis (irrational policy makers) to be, by and large,
factually wrong, and theoretically uninteresting (as we do not have good theories of irra-
tionality).
4. Naturally, the choice of how much to intervene or raise interest rates in response to a neg-
ative shock that tends to weaken the domestic currency is related to the optimal choice of ex-
change rate regimes. An important literature in the 1980s emphasized the fact that the choice
was not limited to the alternatives of ﬁxed versus fully ﬂexible exchange rates, but entailed a
decision on the optimal degree of foreign exchange market intervention (with ﬁxed and ﬂex-
ible rates merely being the extreme cases), as captured by the classic contribution of Aizenman
and Frenkel (1985).develop a simple theoretical model in which, in response to monetary
shocks, the optimal policy response replicates most of the key policy facts
just described.5 In particular, the model predicts that the nominal exchange
rate is a nonmonotonic function of the underlying shock (i.e., for small
shocks, the nominal exchange rate is an increasing function of the shock, but
for large shocks the nominal exchange rate is fully stabilized).
What are the main ingredients of our model? In the model, the fear of
ﬂoating stems from the fact that exchange rate variability leads to output
costs. In the presence of nominal wage rigidities, changes in the exchange
rate lead to changes in the actual real wage, which in turn lead to “volun-
tary unemployment” (to use Barro and Grossman’s 1971 terminology) if the
real wage falls below its equilibrium value, or to “involuntary unemploy-
ment” if the real wage rises above its equilibrium level. (Notice that ex-
change rate variability is costly regardless of whether the domestic currency
depreciates or appreciates.6We model active interest rate defense of the cur-
rency along the lines of Calvo and Végh (1995) by assuming that it basically
entails paying interest on some interest-bearing liquid asset.7 As in Lahiri
and Végh (2000b), we incorporate into the model an output cost of raising
interest rates. Hence, in our model, higher interest rates raise the demand
for domestic liquid assets, but at the cost of a fall in output. Finally, we as-
sume that there is a ﬁxed (social) cost of intervening in foreign exchange
markets.8
In the context of such a model, consider a negative shock to real money
demand. If the shock is small, the output costs entailed by the resulting cur-
rency depreciation will also be small. It is thus optimal for policy makers
not to intervene and to let the currency depreciate. Because exchange rate
ﬂuctuations are costly, however, it is optimal for policy makers to partially
oﬀset the shock to money demand by raising domestic interest rates. Hence,
for small shocks to money demand, the exchange rate and domestic inter-
est rates move in the same direction, whereas reserves do not change.
If the shock is large (i.e., above a well-deﬁned threshold), the output costs
resulting from exchange rate ﬂuctuations would be too large relative to the
cost of intervening. It thus becomes optimal to intervene and stabilize the ex-
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5. For analytical simplicity, we focus only on monetary shocks. As indicated in table 14.1,
monetary aggregates are much more volatile in developing countries, which is consistent with
the idea that monetary shocks are larger.
6. We should stress that this is just a convenient analytical way of capturing costs of ex-
change rate ﬂuctuations. In practice, there may be other (and possibly more important)
sources of costly exchange rate ﬂuctuations (see Calvo and Reinhart 2000b). Our focus is on
analyzing the resulting optimal policy mix and not on providing sophisticated microfounda-
tions for the cost of exchange rate ﬂuctuations.
7. This paper is therefore related to an incipient theoretical literature that analyzes the ac-
tive use of interest rates to defend an exchange rate peg (see Drazen 1999a,b; Flood and Jeanne
2000; Lahiri and Végh 2000a,b).
8. Although it is not explicitly modeled, we view this cost as capturing a ﬁxed cost of port-
folio adjustment for the private sector when it has to deal with the central bank (in the spirit of
asset market segmentation stories in the tradition of Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe [1999]).change rate completely. Consequently, there is no need to raise interest rates
to prop up the currency. Hence, for large negative shocks, international re-
serves fall, but the exchange rate and domestic interest rates do not change.
If we think of the real world as involving a sequence of monetary shocks
(with developed countries facing mostly small shocks and emerging coun-
tries facing mostly large shocks), the model would predict the following.9
First, from a cross-sectional point of view, (a) developing countries should
exhibit low exchange rate variability and high reserve variability, and (b)
conversely, developed countries should exhibit high exchange rate variabil-
ity and low reserve variability. Moreover, from a time-series point of view
(i.e., in individual countries), (c) the correlation between exchange rates and
interest rates should be positive, (d) the correlation between the exchange
rate and reserves should be negative, and (e) the correlation between inter-
est rates and reserves should be negative. The model thus captures some of
the main features of the data described above and should therefore provide
a useful conceptual framework for thinking about policy responses in a
world in which policy makers live with the fear of ﬂoating (i.e., in which
nominal exchange rate ﬂuctuations are costly).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 14.2 develops the model under
ﬂexible wages. Section 14.3 introduces sticky wages into the picture. Section
14.4 analyzes the optimal policy mix under costless intervention. Section
14.5 derives the main results of the paper. Section 14.6 concludes.
14.2 The Model
Consider a small open economy inhabited by an inﬁnitely lived repre-
sentative household. The economy consumes and produces two goods, x
and y, both of which are freely traded. The economy takes the world price
of the two goods as given, and the law of one price is assumed to hold for
both goods. The foreign currency price of good y is assumed to be constant
and, for convenience, normalized to unity. The world relative price of good
xin terms of good yis p, which is also assumed to be constant over time. The
economy has access to perfectly competitive world capital markets where it
can borrow and lend freely in terms of good yat the constant world interest
rate r. Interest parity then implies that i   r   ε, where i is the nominal in-
terest rate and ε is the rate of devaluation or depreciation.
14.2.1 Households
The representative household derives utility from consuming the two
goods and disutility from supplying labor. The household’s lifetime welfare
(W) is given by
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9. Our model is nonstochastic, so this characterization of the predictions is based on the co-
movement of variables in response to a monetary shock. A stochastic simulation of the model
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where
(2) c   (cy) (cx)1  
is a consumption composite index (with cyand cxdenoting consumption of
goods y and x, respectively), ls denotes labor supplied by the household,  
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,   – 1 is the inverse of the elas-
ticity of labor supply with respect to the real wage (as will become evident
below), and  (  0) is the exogenous and constant rate of time preference.10
In order to rule out secular consumption dynamics, we make the standard
assumption that   r. Throughout the paper we maintain a notational dis-
tinction between labor supply and labor demand because, in the presence
of nominal wage rigidities, labor supply will not necessarily equal labor de-
mand at all times.
The household’s ﬂow budget constraint in terms of good y (or foreign
currency) is given by
(3) a ˙t   rat   w tlt
s    t
y    t
x   t
b    t   ct
y   pct
x   It
dht   υ(h ˆ
t;  ),
where w denotes the wage rate in terms of foreign currency (henceforth re-
ferred to as the real wage), Id (  i – id) is the deposit spread (with id denot-
ing the interest rate paid on deposits),  y and  x are dividends received
from ﬁrms in sectors y and x, respectively,  b are dividends from commer-
cial banks,   denotes lump-sum transfers from the government to house-
holds, and a(  b   h) represents net household assets in terms of foreign
currency (where b and h denote net foreign bonds and demand deposits,
respectively, both in terms of the foreign currency).
Real demand deposits held by the household are denoted by h ˆ   H/P,
where H denotes nominal demand deposits and P is the domestic currency
price index of the composite consumption good, c. Transaction costs in-
curred by the household are denoted by υ(h ˆ;  ), where   0 is a positive
constant. As is standard, we assume that the function υ(h ˆ;  )is strictly con-
vex in h ˆ so that υh ˆ   0 and υh ˆh ˆ   0. Thus, the household can reduce trans-
action costs by holding additional demand deposits in terms of the com-
posite consumption good. The parameter  (  0) is a shift parameter for
money demand. In particular, we assume that υ  0 and υh ˆ  0. As will be
clear below, this implies that money demand, h ˆ, is an increasing function of
the parameter  .
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10. We adopt these preferences for analytical convenience, because they imply that the la-
bor supply decision becomes independent of wealth. Moreover, Correia, Neves, and Rebelo
(1995) have shown that these preferences provide a better description of current account dy-
namics for small open economies than standard constant elasticity of substitution preferences.Given equation (2), it is easy to establish that the domestic currency price
index is given by











where E denotes the nominal exchange rate (domestic currency price of the
foreign currency), while B [  (1 –  )1– ]/[p1– ] is a positive constant.11Since
h   H/E, equation (4) implies that h ˆ   Bh. Hence, transaction costs are
given by υ(h ˆ;  )   υ(Bh;  ). Since the relative price p is constant over time,
it is also easy to see from equation (4) that the rate of inﬂation must equal
the rate of currency depreciation (ε) at all points in time. Hence, we must
have P ˙/P   E ˙/E   ε.
Integrating the household’s ﬂow constraint subject to the transversality
condition on a gives
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To simplify the analysis, it will be assumed that the transaction costs tech-
nology is quadratic. Formally,




where   and κ are positive constants.
The household chooses time paths for cy, cx, ls and h to maximize equa-
tion (1) subject to equations (5) and (6), where h ˆ   Bh, and taking as given
a0 and the paths for w,  , r, p, Id,  y,  x and  b. The ﬁrst-order conditions
for utility maximization imply that
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11. P is the consumption-based price index, which is deﬁned as the minimum expenditure
required to purchase one unit of the composite consumption index, (cy) (cx)1– .(12) lt





t   
1/(  1)
,
(13) Bht   h ˆ
t    
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Equation (11) says that the marginal rate of consumption substitution be-
tween the two goods must equal their relative price. Equation (12) shows
that households’ labor supply is an increasing function of the real wage. Fi-
nally, equation (13) says that real money demand in terms of good y must
be falling in the opportunity cost of holding deposits, Id. Also, for a given
Id, a higher   implies that h must go up. Hence, the parameter   can be
thought of as a shock to money demand.
14.2.2 Firms
Since there are two distinct sectors in this economy, there are two types
of ﬁrms: those that produce good y and those that produce good x. Both
sectors are assumed to be perfectly competitive.12
Sector y Firms
The industry producing good y is characterized by perfectly competitive
ﬁrms that hire labor to produce the good using the technology
(14) yt   (lt
d) ,   ∈ (0, 1],
where lddenotes labor demand. Firms may hold foreign bonds, by. Thus, the
ﬂow constraint faced by the ﬁrm is
(15) b ˙
t
y   rbt
y   (lt
d)    w tlt
d    t
y.
Integrating forward equation (15), imposing the standard transversality




e rt  t
ydt   by




d)    w tlt
d]e rtdt.
The ﬁrm chooses a path of ldto maximize the present discounted value of
dividends, which is given by the right-hand side (RHS) of equation (16),
taking as given the paths for w t, Il
t, r, and the initial stock of ﬁnancial assets
b f
0. The ﬁrst-order condition for this problem is given by
(17)  (lt
d)  1   w t.
Equation (17) yields the ﬁrm’s demand for labor:
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12. In case of decreasing returns, we implicitly assume—as is standard—that there is some
ﬁxed factor in the background (owned by households), which makes the technology (inclusive
of this ﬁxed factor) constant returns to scale.(18) lt
d    
w
 
t   
1/(  1)
,
which shows that, for 0    1, labor demand by ﬁrms is decreasing in the
real wage.
One should note that in the case of a linear production function (i.e.,   
1), the ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximization (eq. [17]) reduces to
w t   1.
The labor demand schedule in this case is zero for any real wage above 1 and
inﬁnitely elastic for w t   1.
Sector x Firms
Sector xis also characterized by perfectly competitive ﬁrms that produce
good x. Firms in this sector use an imported input q to produce good x, ac-
cording to the technology given by
(19) xt   qt
 ,   ∈ (0, 1),
where q denotes the imported input. The world relative price of q in terms
of good y is p q, which is assumed to be constant. To economize on notation
and with no loss of generality, we assume p q   1. Sector-x ﬁrms are, how-
ever, dependent on bank loans for their working capital needs. In particu-
lar, we assume that ﬁrms face a credit-in-advance constraint to pay for the
imported input:
(20) nt   ψqt, ψ   0,
where n denotes loans from commercial banks. This constraint introduces
a demand for bank loans, and hence a credit channel, into the model. As is
well known, this constraint will hold as an equality along all paths where the
cost of loans, Il, is positive. (In addition, we will assume that it holds as an
equality if Il   0.)
Firms may hold foreign bonds, bx. Hence, the real ﬁnancial wealth of the
representative ﬁrm at time t is given by at
x   bt
x – nt. Using il to denote the
lending rate charged by banks and letting Il   il – i denote the lending
spread, we can write the ﬂow constraint faced by the ﬁrm as
(21) a ˙t
x   rat
x   pxt   qt   Il
tnt    t
x.
Integrating forward equation (21), imposing the standard transversality




e rt  t
xdt   a0




    qt(1   ψIl
t)]e rtdt.
Note that the credit-in-advance constraint introduces an extra cost of in-
puts to the ﬁrm, given by ψIl (per unit of input).
672 Amartya Lahiri and Carlos A. VéghThe ﬁrm chooses a path of qto maximize the present discounted value of
dividends, given by the RHS of equation (22), taking as given the paths for
Il
t, r, and the initial stock of ﬁnancial assets, a0
x. The ﬁrst-order condition for
proﬁt maximization is given by
(23) p qt
  1   1   ψIl
t.
Equation (23) implies that the demand for the imported input is given by








Hence, the ﬁrm’s demand for the imported input is decreasing in the lend-
ing spread. This captures the credit channel in our model. Finally, the loan
demand by sector-x ﬁrms can be determined from equation (24) as








For later reference, it is useful to note ∂n/∂Il   0 and ∂2n/∂(Il)2   0. Hence,
the input demand for q is also a decreasing and convex function of Il.
14.2.3 Banks
The economy is assumed to have a perfectly competitive banking sector.
We formalize the banking sector along the lines of Lahiri and Végh (2000b).
The representative bank takes deposits from consumers, lends to sector-x
ﬁrms (n), and holds domestic government bonds (zb).13The bank charges an
interest rate of ilto ﬁrms and earns igon government bonds. It also holds re-
quired cash reserves, m (high-powered money). The bank pays depositors
an interest rate of id. Thus, the balance sheet identity of the bank implies
that mt   nt   zt
b   ht.14
Letting Ig   ig – i denote the interest rate spread from lending to the gov-
ernment, the ﬂow constraint of the representative bank is
(26)  t
b   Il
tnt   It
dht   It
gzt
b   itmt.
Let  (  0) denote the reserve-requirement ratio imposed by the central
bank. Note that, because required reserves are non–interest bearing, the
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13. Commercial bank lending to governments is particularly common in developing coun-
tries. Government debt is held not only as a compulsory (and remunerated) reverse require-
ment but also voluntarily, due to the lack of proﬁtable investment opportunities in crisis-prone
countries. This phenomenon was so pervasive in some Latin American countries during the
1980s that Rodriguez (1991) aptly refers to such governments as “borrowers of ﬁrst resort.” For
additional evidence, see Druck and Garibaldi (2000).
14. Similar results would go through if we allowed banks to hold foreign bonds in world cap-
ital markets as long as banks face a cost of managing domestic assets (along the lines of Ed-
wards and Végh 1997, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 1999, or Agenor and Aizenman
1999). Put diﬀerently—and as is well known—some friction needs to exist at the banking level
in order for banks to play a nontrivial role in the credit-transmission mechanism. We chose the
speciﬁcation with no foreign borrowing because it is analytically simpler.opportunity cost of holding required reserves for banks is the forgone nom-
inal interest rate, i. Hence, at an optimum, the bank will not hold any excess
reserves. Formally,
(27) mt    ht.
The representative commercial bank’s balance sheet identity can thus be
written as
(28) (1    )ht   nt   zt
b.
The bank maximizes proﬁts by choosing sequences of nt, zt
b, ht, and mt sub-
ject to equations (27) and (28), taking as given the paths of Il, Id, Ig,  , and
i. The ﬁrst-order conditions for the banks’ optimization problem are (as-
suming an interior solution)
(29) (1    ) Il
t   It
d    it,
(30) (1    ) It
g   It
d    it.
Conditions (29) and (30) simply say that, at an optimum, the representative
bank equates the marginal cost of deposits (RHS) to the marginal revenue
from an extra unit of deposits (left-hand side). Note that the marginal rev-
enue from an additional unit of deposits has two components. The ﬁrst, given
by It
d, is due to the fact that borrowing from consumers is cheaper for banks
(whenever It
d   0) than borrowing in the open market. The second, given by
either (1 –  ) Il
t or (1 –  ) It
g, captures the fact that banks can lend a fraction 
1 –   of each additional unit of deposits to either ﬁrms or the government.
Equations (29) and (30) imply that we must have
(31) It
g   Il
t.
This also implies that il   ig: that is, the lending rate to ﬁrms must equal the
interest rate on government bonds. Intuitively, loans and government bonds
are perfect substitutes in the bank’s asset portfolio. Because the bank can
get ig by lending to the government, it must receive at least as much from
ﬁrms in order to extend loans to them.
From equation (30), it is also easy to see that the deposit spread, Id, is
given by
(32) It
d   it   (1    )it
g.
Because Id i– id, it follows immediately that we must have it
d (1 –  )it
gfor
all t. Thus, a rise in the domestic interest rate, ig, must result in a higher de-
posit rate for consumers and, hence, an increase in demand deposits. Be-
cause ig may be controlled by policy makers, the preceding shows that in-
terest rate policy in this model eﬀectively amounts to the government being
able to pay interest on money.
Finally, we will restrict attention to parameter ranges for which Id and Il
674 Amartya Lahiri and Carlos A. Véghare nonnegative. Thus, we will conﬁne attention to environments where id 
i   ig. This restriction is needed to ensure a determinate demand for both
loans and demand deposits. Note that this amounts to restricting the rele-
vant interest rates to the range 0   ig – i    ig.
14.2.4 Government
The government is composed of the ﬁscal authority and the monetary au-
thority (i.e., the central bank). The ﬁscal authority makes lump-sum trans-
fers ( ) to the public and issues domestic bonds (Z), which are held either by
the monetary authority or commercial banks. Domestic bonds are interest
bearing and pay ig per unit. The monetary authority issues high-powered
money (M), holds government bonds (Zg), and sets the reserve requirement
ratio ( ) on deposits. The central bank also holds foreign exchange reserves
(R), which bear the world rate of interest, r. Thus, the consolidated govern-
ment’s ﬂow budget constraint is given by
(33) R ˙
t   rRt   m ˙t   z ˙t
b   εtmt   (εt   it
g)zt
b    t,
where we have used the fact that the government’s net liability to the private
sector (in terms of domestic bonds) is zb   z – zg (where z denotes the real
stock of domestic bonds and zg is the real stock of domestic bonds held by
the central bank).
The central bank’s balance sheet identity (in terms of foreign currency) is
given by
(34) Rt   zt   zt
b   mt.
Note that zg( z– zb) is the monetary authority’s real domestic credit to the
public sector. We assume that the ﬁscal authority keeps the nominal stock






t     µt   0, Z0   Z  .
Using equations (34) and (35), equation (33) can be rewritten as:
(36)  t   rRt   εt(mt   zt)   (εt   it
g)zt
b.
In this model, policy makers may choose to use ig as a policy instrument.
In that case, and for analytical convenience, we will think of Ig as the policy
instrument (recall that, by deﬁnition, Ig   ig – i). Given that, as shown be-
low, it rfor all t, the central bank can always set an igto implement the de-
sired value of Ig.16We shall also assume that the government lets ﬁscal trans-
fers   adjust endogenously so that equation (36) is satisﬁed.
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15. This is the natural assumption to make, given that we will abstract from ﬁscal consider-
ations and focus only on stationary equilibria involving constant nominal variables.
16. For expositional purposes, we will often refer to Ig as the domestic interest rate.It is useful at this stage to restate the two key eﬀects of interest rate pol-
icy in the model. First, because government bonds and bank credit to ﬁrms
are perfect substitutes in the banks’ portfolios, a higher interest rate on
government bonds leads to an increase in the lending rate. This reduces
bank credit and causes an output contraction (see eq. [24] and [31]). This
eﬀect will be referred to as the output eﬀect of interest rate policy. Second,
the higher interest rate on government bonds induces banks to also pay a
higher rate on bank deposits (recall that id   (1 –  )ig) and, as a result, in-
creases the demand for bank deposits. We will refer to this as the money de-
mand eﬀect.
14.2.5 Resource Constraint
By combining the ﬂow constraints for the consumer, the ﬁrms in sector x
and sector y, the bank and the government (eq. [3], [15], [21], [26], and [33])
we get the economy’s ﬂow resource constraint:
(37) k ˙
t   rkt   y t   pxt   ct
y   pct
x   qt   υ(Bht;  ),
where k   R   b   by   bx. Note that the RHS of equation (37) is simply
the economy’s current account. Integrating forward subject to the no-
Ponzi-game condition gives
(38) k0   
 
0
[y t   pxt   ct
y   pct
x   qt   υ(Bht;  )]e rtdt   0.
14.2.6 Policy Regimes
Before proceeding to deﬁne the diﬀerent policy regimes in this economy,
notice that the rate of devaluation or depreciation (ε) will always be zero in
this stationary economy. Under a ﬁxed exchange rate, this is trivially true.
Under a ﬂoating regime, this follows from the fact that (as shown below),
the real stock of domestic bonds will be constant along a perfect foresight
equilibrium path.
In this economy, policy makers have, in principle, four diﬀerent policy in-
struments: the exchange rate (E), international reserves (R), the domestic
interest rate (Ig), and nominal domestic credit (Zg). Only two of these four
instruments, however, can be chosen independently. For any two instru-
ments controlled by the central bank, the other two will adjust endoge-
nously. To see this, consider the following equations, which are the relevant
ones for monetary policy purposes:




     h,
(40) Z    Ezb   Zg,
(41) n   zb   (1    )h,
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that Ig   Il), h is a function of Id through the money demand equation (13),
and Ig and Id are linked through equation (30) (recall that, as will be shown
below, ε   0). Equation (39) is the central bank’s balance sheet, equation
(40) is the equilibrium condition in the government bond market, and equa-
tion (41) is the commercial bank’s balance sheet. Equations (39)–(41) thus
deﬁne a system of three equations in ﬁve unknowns (E, R, zb, Zg, and Ig).
This implies that there are two policy variables that can be set by policy
makers.
For the purposes of the subsequent analysis, we can therefore deﬁne the
following policy regimes:
1. Fixed exchange rate. Policy makers ﬁx E at a certain level and set Zg.
Both international reserves and Ig adjust endogenously.17 This regime is in-
tended to capture a hard peg (in the style of Argentina or Hong Kong) in
which the monetary authority maintains a constant backing (in terms of in-
ternational reserves) of the monetary base and thus completely forgoes ac-
tive monetary policy (i.e., the monetary authority allows Ig to be deter-
mined by market forces).
2. Pure ﬂoating. Policy makers ﬁx R at a certain level and set Ig. Both the
exchange rate and Zg adjust endogenously. This regime is intended to cap-
ture a ﬂoating regime in which policy makers actively engage in monetary
policy by setting domestic interest rates.
3. Dirty ﬂoating. Policy makers set R (and may change it in response to
shocks) as well as Ig, whereas E and Zg adjust endogenously.
4. Fully sterilized intervention. Policy makers target a constant level of h
(real demand deposits)—and hence of the real monetary base—and set the
level of zg(real domestic credit). In this case, both reserves and the exchange
rate adjust endogenously.
14.2.7 Flexible Wages Equilibrium
We now characterize the perfect foresight equilibrium path (PFEP) for
this economy under ﬂexible wages and ﬂoating exchange rates (either the
pure ﬂoating or the dirty ﬂoating regimes, as deﬁned above) under the as-
sumption that   is expected to remain constant over time. In both cases
(pure and dirty ﬂoating), policy makers keep the stock of international re-
serves constant along a PFEP.18 Along this PFEP, policy makers set ig at a
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17. We will also refer to this case below as the full intervention case, because the central bank
keeps the exchange rate ﬁxed by intervening in the foreign exchange market.
18. Under dirty ﬂoating, and in response to unanticipated shocks to money demand (as an-
alyzed below), the central bank will be allowed to undertake a discrete intervention when the
shock hits. Notice that if the path of   were not constant over time (a case we do not address
here), dirty ﬂoating could also be characterized by discrete interventions along a PFEP.constant level. Because, as shown above, id   (1 –  )ig, this implies that id is
also constant along a PFEP.
The labor market clearing condition dictates that labor demand equal la-
bor supply, that is, lt
s   lt
d. Imposing this condition on equations (12), (17),
and (25) yields the equilibrium labor and real wage for this economy (equi-
librium values of labor and real wage are denoted with a bar):





1/(   )
,





(  1)/(   )
.
In other words, along a PFEP, both employment and the real wage are con-
stant.
Next, notice that the evolution of the stock of real domestic bonds is
given by z ˙/z   –ε (because, by deﬁnition, z   Z/E and Z is constant from
eq. [35]). By combining equations (39) and (41), we obtain z   h – n – R0.
Recall from equations (13) and (25) that h is a decreasing function of r  
ε – id, whereas n is a decreasing function of ig – r – ε. Because ig and id are
constant along a PFEP, it follows that z is solely a function of ε along such a
path. Furthermore, we can implicitly solve for εas a function of zand write
ε   ε ~(z), where, as can be easily veriﬁed, ε ~ (z)   0. Hence, it follows that
(44) z ˙t    ε ~(zt)zt.
By linearizing equation (44) around a steady state (where ε ~[zt]   0), it fol-
lows that this is an unstable diﬀerential equation. Hence, z must always be
equal to its steady-state level. This implies, in turn, that ε 0 along a PFEP.
Hence, h and n are also constant along a PFEP. This determines, through
equation (41), the level of zb. For this level of zb and a given R0, equations
(39) and (40) determine the constant level of the exchange rate:
(45) E    
m    R
Z  
0   z  
b  ,
where m  (   h  ) and z  
b denote the constant values of real money balances
and loans. Equation (45) shows that policy makers have two avenues for in-
ﬂuencing the exchange rate. First, for a given R0, they can use interest rate
policy to aﬀect Id and Il. This will inﬂuence m   and z  
b directly and, hence,
change E. Second, for a given m  and z  
b, they can intervene in the foreign ex-
change market and alter the level of R0and, hence, E. The determination of
the optimal mix of these two policies is an issue that we will return to later.
In order to determine steady-state consumption, notice that equation
(11) implies that the ratio cx/cy is a constant. Hence, c/cy must also be con-
stant. This, combined with the ﬁrst-order condition for consumption and
the fact that the equilibrium level of employment l  is constant, implies that
678 Amartya Lahiri and Carlos A. Véghcy, cx, and c must all be constant. The country resource constraint then im-
plies that the constant levels of consumption of the two goods are given by
c  
y    rk0   l      p  
1  
p 
ψIl   
 /(1  )
   
1  
p 
ψIl   
1/(1  )
  υ(Bht;  ) ,
pc  
x   (1    ) rk0   l      p  
1  
p 
ψIl   
 /(1  )
   
1  
p 
ψIl   
1/(1  )
  υ(Bht;  ) .
14.2.8 Money Demand Shocks under Flexible Wages
As a benchmark case, consider an unanticipated and permanent fall in  
(i.e., a negative money demand shock) under a pure ﬂoating rate and ﬂexi-
ble wages. Because real money demand decreases, the nominal exchange
rate rises instantaneously (i.e., the currency depreciates) to accommodate
the lower real money demand (see eq. [45]). Furthermore, the nominal wage
rises by the same proportion as the exchange rate. Thus, with an unchanged
interest rate policy, the real side of the economy remains completely insu-
lated. Consumption of both goods falls because the equilibrium level of
transactions cost rises. Note that under a ﬁxed exchange rate (i.e., full in-
tervention), the economy would also adjust instantaneously as the central
bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market (by selling international re-
serves), thus accommodating the fall in real money demand.
14.3 Nominal Wage Rigidities
14.3.1 Perfect Foresight Equilibrium Path 
under Flexible Exchange Rates
We now depart from the ﬂexible wages paradigm by introducing a nom-
inal wage rigidity into the model. We will examine ﬁrst the case of ﬂexible
exchange rates.19 We assume that nominal wages cannot jump at any point
in time.Hence,the labor market clearing condition ld ls l   does not nec-
essarily hold at all points in time. In particular, it is assumed that nominal
wages, W, adjust according to the following dynamic equation:
(46) W ˙
t    w     
W
Et
t   , W 0 given,
where   ∈ (0,  ) captures the speed of adjustment toward the equilibrium
real wage, w  . Recall that w  is given by equation (43). The implication of in-
troducing sticky nominal wages (as shown below) is that a depreciation of
the currency will now lead to a fall in the real wage and cause a temporary
labor market disequilibrium and concomitant output losses in sector y.
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19. As will become clear below, in the ﬁxed exchange rate case, the real sector remains insu-
lated from monetary shocks.Using the previously shown result that, along any PFEP with ﬂexible ex-
change rates, E must already be at its steady state value E  at time t   0, one
can solve equation (46) to get
(47) w t   w    e ( /E  )t (w 0   w  ),
where w t   W t/E  and w 0   W 0/E  . Notice that limt→ w t   w  . Moreover, w ˙t   0
for w t   w  . Finally, the equilibrium nominal wage is given by W    w  E  .
As in standard disequilibrium models, it will be assumed that actual em-
ployment is given by the short end of the market. In other words, when the
real wage is below (above) its equilibrium value, actual labor is determined
by labor supply (demand). Notice that this disequilibrium model implies
that only one of the two labor optimality conditions will hold. If the real
wage is below its equilibrium value, the household’s labor condition (eq. [9])
will hold, but the ﬁrm’s (eq. [18]) will not. Conversely, if the real wage is
above its equilibrium value, the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order condition will hold, but the
household’s will not.
There are two potential cases of disequilibrium. For w 0   w t   w  , we have
lt
a   lt
s   (Bw t/ ζ)1/( –1). Substituting in for w t from equation (47) and simpli-
fying the result yields the path for actual employment:
(48) lt
a   l   1    
w
w  




0   (Bw 0/ ζ)1/( –1). Analogously, for the case w 0   w t   w  , we have lt
a  
lt
d   (w t/ )1/( –1). The path for actual employment is now given by
(49) lt
a   l   1       
w
w  




0   (w 0/ )1/( –1). Substituting these relations into equation (14) yields
the time path of output of good y for each case.
It is useful to note that, in both cases, la l  throughout the transition. In-
tuitively, any deviation of the real wage from its equilibrium value implies
that the short end of the labor market determines actual employment. In the
case of an unanticipated increase in the real wage, labor demand falls while
labor supply goes up (relative to the equilibrium). Because labor demand is
the short side of the market, actual employment equals labor demand.
Hence, output of sector y falls. Conversely, when the real wage is below the
equilibrium, labor supply is smaller, whereas labor demand is greater rel-
ative  to the equilibrium. In this event, actual employment is supply-
determined. Hence, employment falls and output of sector y declines.20
This result is key to understanding the real eﬀects of exchange rate ﬂuc-
tuations within this model. It implies that currency appreciation and de-
preciation are both contractionary. This result stands in stark contrast to
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20. This case is exactly what Barro and Grossman (1971) called “voluntary unemployment”
in their analysis of disequilibrium models.the standard Mundell-Fleming model with rigid prices in which deprecia-
tions are expansionary whereas appreciations are contractionary. The
diﬀerence arises because the standard models in the Mundell-Fleming tra-
dition postulate output to be demand-determined, with demand being a
function of the real exchange rate. As this model shows, introduction of an
explicit supply side alters the implications quite dramatically.
The consumption dynamics along the adjustment path can be deter-
mined directly from the employment dynamics. Noting that   is constant
along a PFEP and cx/cy and c/cy are both constants at all times, one can di-
ﬀerentiate the ﬁrst-order condition (eq. [7]) with respect to time to get
(50) c ˙t   ζ (lt
a)  1 l˙
t
a   0,
which says that consumption rises along with employment during the tran-
sition. There is a unique time path of consumption that satisﬁes equation
(50) and the intertemporal resource constraint. Given the paths for cand la,
the values of c0 and la
0 would then determine the value of the multiplier
through the ﬁrst-order condition given by equation (7). Clearly, welfare will
be lower than it would be under ﬂexible wages (and ﬂoating rates), because
either ﬁrms in sector yare forced to accept a path for labor that does not sat-
isfy their ﬁrst-order condition given by equation (17), or the ﬁrst-order con-
dition for households, equation (9), is violated.21
14.3.2 The Menu of Policy Options
We can now describe the economy’s response to a negative money de-
mand shock (i.e., an unanticipated and permanent fall in  ) in the presence
of sticky wages under the four policy regimes deﬁned above. (Table 14.2
summarizes the outcome under these four diﬀerent options.) Notice that,
on the monetary side, the economy will always adjust instantaneously to
this shock. On the real side, sector-x output will always adjust instanta-
neously as well. On the other hand, sector-y output will adjust gradually
over time if the exchange rate deviates from its initial steady state along the
lines described above.
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21. Notice that an important advantage of this framework over a model with demand-
determined output is that welfare analysis in our model is well deﬁned.
Table 14.2 Response to a Negative Money Demand Shock
Policy Regime REI g zg h
Fixed exchange rate ↓→↑→↓
Floating exchange rate →↑→↓↓
Dirty ﬂoating ↓↑→ →↓
Full sterilization ↓↓↑↑→
Optimal policy (small shock) → ↑↑↓↓
Optimal policy (large shock) ↓→→↑↓
Note: Under dirty ﬂoating, the increase in E is smaller than under pure ﬂoating.1. Fixed exchange rate. Under a ﬁxed exchange rate, policy makers re-
spond to the shock by keeping E and Zg unchanged. Hence, real domestic
credit, zg, also remains unchanged. From equation (40), it follows that zb
will not change either. Because the negative money demand shock reduces
real demand for deposits, the commercial bank’s balance sheet (eq. [41]) im-
plies that loans, n, must fall. However, this can only occur through a rise in
Ig. In the new equilibrium, the fall in real money demand is smaller than the
initial shock because the rise in the domestic interest rate partially oﬀsets
the money demand shock. International reserves decline endogenously to
accommodate the lower level of base money.
Intuitively, the initial fall in real demand deposits induces a fall in the de-
mand for government bonds by commercial banks. At unchanged levels of
central bank holdings of government bonds, zg, and the nominal exchange
rate, E, this implies an excess supply of government bonds. The central
bank responds to this by raising domestic interest rates, because this makes
domestic bonds and demand deposits more attractive to the private sector.
On the real side, sector-y output remains unchanged at its equilibrium
level. Since the exchange rate is ﬁxed, the actual wage will not deviate from
the equilibrium real wage, and there will be no disequilibrium in the labor
market. In contrast, higher domestic interest rates extract an output cost in
sector x as banking credit becomes more expensive and banking lending
falls. In addition, the fall in real money balances implies an increase in
transaction costs.
2. Pure ﬂoating. Under pure ﬂoating, policy makers respond to the neg-
ative money demand shock by keeping international reserves, R, and the
domestic interest rate, Ig, unchanged, while allowing the exchange rate and
domestic credit to adjust endogenously. An unchanged domestic interest
rate implies that base money falls by the full amount of the shock. Because
R is unchanged, real domestic credit, zg, must fall to accommodate the
shock. The fall in demand deposits along with an unchanged lending rate
(and hence loan demand) implies that the demand for government bonds by
commercial banks, zb, falls. The excess supply of government bonds implies
that its price, 1/E, falls: that is, the currency depreciates.
In the pure ﬂoating case, sector x remains completely insulated from the
shock, because the domestic interest rate remains unchanged. However, the
depreciation of the currency implies a fall in the real wage. Hence, the labor
market goes into disequilibrium on impact and returns to the steady state
asymptotically, as shown by equations (47) and (48). Hence, the output of
sector yremains below the steady-state level throughout the adjustment pe-
riod. Moreover, the policy also implies a contraction in real deposits and,
hence, higher transaction costs and lower consumption.
3. Dirty ﬂoating. Under dirty ﬂoating, policy makers intervene in the for-
eign exchange market (by selling international reserves) to achieve a smaller
increase in the exchange rate (i.e., a smaller depreciation) than under the pure
ﬂoating case. Speciﬁcally, suppose that policy makers reduce Rso as to main-
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change, it follows from equation (41) that zb will fall. This, in turn, implies
from equation (40) that E rises. Notice that this rise in E will be less than in
the pure ﬂoating case described above. The reason is that zbfalls by the same
amount in either case, whereas zgfalls under a pure ﬂoat but does not change
under dirty ﬂoating. From equation (40), it follows that E will rise by less.
Intuitively, starting from the pure ﬂoating case described above, policy
makers intervene in foreign exchange markets by selling international re-
serves. Because the domestic interest rate is kept unchanged, the lower
stock of international reserves will be reﬂected in a higher stock of real do-
mestic credit. This implies that, at the level of the exchange rate that prevails
under pure ﬂoating, there is an excess demand for government bonds.
Hence, their price (1/E) must increase, which implies that E must fall (rela-
tive to the pure ﬂoating case). The outcome is that the currency depreciates
by less than it does in the pure ﬂoating case, while international reserves fall.
Because the currency depreciates by less under dirty ﬂoating, the output
losses in sector y will be lower than under pure ﬂoating. There are no out-
put costs in sector x.
4. Fully sterilized intervention. In our deﬁnition, the case of a fully steril-
ized intervention means keeping the level of real money demand unchanged
and targeting a higher level of real domestic credit.22 In this case, the do-
mestic interest rate, the level of international reserves, and the exchange rate
will adjust endogenously. In order for real demand deposits to remain un-
changed, equation (13) implies that ( /2) – (Id/2B) must remain unchanged.
Hence, in response to a fall in  , Idmust fall. From equation (30), a fall in Id
implies a rise in Ig. Hence, loans (n) must fall, while commercial bank hold-
ings of government debt (zb) rise by an oﬀsetting amount. Because, by con-
struction, zg has gone up, the nominal exchange rate must fall (i.e., the cur-
rency appreciates). International reserves fall one-to-one with the increase
in real domestic credit.
Intuitively, under a fully sterilized intervention, the central bank reacts to
a negative money demand shock by increasing domestic credit through a
purchase of government bonds while raising the domestic interest rate in or-
der to keep money demand unchanged. The resulting increase in the lend-
ing rate causes sector-x ﬁrms to reduce their loan demand. Commercial
banks react to the lower demand for loans by increasing their demand for
government bonds. Hence, the total demand for government bonds rises.
Because the nominal supply of these bonds is ﬁxed, their price, 1/E, must
rise. Hence, Emust fall (i.e., the currency appreciates). The ﬁnal outcome is
a change in the composition of central bank assets (lower international re-
serves and higher real domestic credit) with no change in the level.
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22. Naturally, this scenario assumes that the initial level of h ˆ is still technologically feasible
after the shock. (Recall from eq. [6] that the transaction technology imposes the restriction that
h ˆ    /2.)While this policy succeeds in insulating domestic money demand from
the negative shock (which implies that transaction costs fall by less than
they would otherwise), this insulation comes at the expense of higher do-
mestic interest rates and an appreciation of the currency. The higher inter-
est rate causes an output contraction in sector x. The appreciation, on the
other hand, induces a rise in the real wage (recall that nominal wages are
rigid) and a fall in labor demand and sector-y output.
In the next section we will show that the optimal policy mix (when inter-
vention is costless) implies that none of these extreme cases is optimal. In-
stead, the optimum falls somewhere in the “interior” of these pure cases.
14.3.3 Real versus Monetary Shocks
We conclude this section by noting that this model reproduces the stan-
dard Mundell-Fleming results regarding the optimal exchange rate regime
under ﬁxed and ﬂexible rates. Under ﬁxed exchange rates, sticky wages
make no diﬀerence in the adjustment path of the economy. Put diﬀerently,
the economy adjusts instantaneously under ﬁxed rates and sticky wages, as
the central bank buys and sells reserves to keep Eunchanged. Thus, relative
to ﬂexible exchange rates, ﬁxed exchange rates are better for insulating the
real side of the economy from monetary shocks.
To think about real shocks in this model, consider a shock to p, the relative
price of good x. This shock changes the equilibrium real wage and, hence, re-
quires a change in the market real wage. Under ﬂexible rates, this would hap-
pen instantaneously through a change in the nominal exchange rate. Under
ﬁxed exchange rates and rigid nominal wages, the economy cannot adjust in-
stantaneously, because neither the nominal wage nor the nominal exchange
rate can jump. The economy returns to the long-run equilibrium only
through a slow adjustment of the nominal wage accompanied by an output
contraction in sector y (unless, of course, there is a policy change in the ex-
change rate). Thus, for the purposes of insulating the real side of the economy
from real shocks, ﬂexible exchange rates are better than ﬁxed exchange rates.
14.4 Optimal Stabilization Policy
Having described the adjustment of the economy to money demand
shocks under diﬀerent policy regimes, we now turn to the issue of the opti-
mal policy response to such shocks.23For the purposes of solving for the op-
timal policy response to a monetary shock, we will view policy makers as
optimally choosing the domestic interest rate, Ig, and the level of interna-
tional reserves (which, if diﬀerent from the preshock level, implies a discrete
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23. For analytical convenience, this section solves for the optimal policy in the absence of a
ﬁxed cost of intervention (a key feature of the model to be introduced in the next section). The
next section solves for the optimal policy problem in the complete model.one-shot intervention in the foreign exchange market). It is clear from equa-
tions (39)–(41) that an optimal choice of Igand Rwill imply a unique choice
of E, Zg, and zb.
To study the optimal policy response, start from a steady state with   
1, E E  , m m  , and R R  , and consider an unanticipated and permanent
fall in  at time t 0. The policy maker’s goal is to choose Ig
0and R0to max-
imize the welfare of the representative agent. Solving the optimal policy
problem becomes greatly simpliﬁed due to the following proposition.
P 1. Given any choice of Ig
0 by the policy maker in response to a
money demand shock (i.e., an   shock), it can never be optimal for the central
bank to choose an R0 such that E0   E  .
P. Recall that any E0   E  implies that the market real wage W 0/E0  
w     W 0/E  , where w   is the equilibrium real wage. Hence, output and em-
ployment must fall on impact and then rise gradually back toward the long-
run steady state. The central bank can always choose R0 such that m  – R   
z  
b m0– R0 zb
0. Such a choice of R0would imply that E0 E  , which would
leave the labor market completely unaﬀected and, hence, the output of sec-
tor y unchanged. Moreover, output of sector x is independent of the size of
the intervention. Because intervention is costless from the perspective of
the country as a whole, country wealth is unaﬀected by the size of inter-
vention (a larger R merely corresponds to lower private foreign bond hold-
ings, b, leaving kunchanged). Hence, this particular choice of R0dominates
any other postshock choice of reserves.
Proposition 1 implies that the policy maker will respond to a monetary
shock by always keeping the nominal exchange rate unchanged so as to in-
sulate the economy from any labor market frictions. Hence, at the time of
the shock, the economy adjusts immediately to a new stationary equilib-
rium. The problem is thus reduced to a choice of optimal real money bal-
ances in a stationary economy through an appropriate choice of Ig. Once m
(and hence zb) is chosen, the optimal intervention involves choosing an R0
such that E0   E  .
Note that proposition 1 immediately eliminates from the set of optimal
policies the option of allowing the adjustment (in part or in its entirety) to
occur through an adjustment of the nominal exchange rate. Hence, it is al-
ready clear that neither the pure ﬂoating nor the dirty ﬂoating regimes con-
sidered above will prove to be the optimal policy response.
The stationarity of the economy implies that the representative house-
hold’s lifetime welfare is given by
W   [(c   ζl   )1 (1/ )   1],
1
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labor market is always in equilibrium. Hence, la   l  . For a stationary econ-
omy, the country resource constraint given by equation (38) implies that
cy   pcx   rk0   l      pq    q   (h ˆ2    h ˆ   κ).
Moreover, the ﬁrst-order conditions for consumption imply that cy pcx 
cy/  and c/B   cy/ . Hence, the economy’s resource constraint reduces to
c   B [rk0   l      pq    q   (h ˆ2    h ˆ   κ)].
Because c – ζl    is constant along any perfect foresight equilibrium path
while W is monotonically rising in c – ζl   , the policy maker’s problem re-
duces to choosing Ig, Ig ∈ {0, [ /(1 –  )]r}, to maximize c – ζl    (  W ˆ peg) sub-
ject to equations (13), (24), and (30), for a given  , k0, and l  . Note that
welfare in this case corresponds to welfare under a ﬁxed exchange rate.
The country resource constraint implies that
(51) W ˆ peg   Brk0   Bl      ζl      B (pq    q)   B (h ˆ2    h ˆ   κ).
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In the following we shall use Ig
peg to denote the optimal value of Igin the case
where the policy maker keeps the exchange rate pegged at all times. Ig
pegis de-
ﬁned by the relation  Ig
peg   0. It is easy to determine from equation (52)
that  I
g 0   0 and  I
g [ /(1– )]r   0. Hence, Ig
peg ∈ {0, [ /(1– )]r}. In other
words, the optimal domestic interest rate lies strictly in the interior of the
permissible range. Note that Ig   [ /(1– )]r corresponds to Id   0, which is
equivalent to implementing the Friedman rule.
Equation (52) clearly shows the two key margins over which the policy
maker chooses the optimal Ig. First, a higher Ig implies that Il goes up.
Hence, the cost of funds for sector-x ﬁrms goes up, which implies that out-
put (net of the import bill) and, consequently, consumption falls. This eﬀect
is captured by the ﬁrst term on the RHS of equation (52). However, a higher
Ig also implies a higher deposit rate for depositors and hence a lower op-
portunity cost of holding deposits, Id. This causes money demand to go up,
which, in turn, reduces transaction costs and thereby increases consump-
tion. This is the positive money demand eﬀect of higher domestic interest
rates that is captured by the second term in the RHS of equation (52). Note
that the Friedman rule (Id   0) emerges as the optimum when ψ   0. When
ψ   0, higher lending rates do not have any output eﬀect, because ﬁrms do
not rely on bank credit at all. Thus, it is optimal to raise the domestic inter-
est rate all the way to Ig   [ /(1 –  )]r, which implies that Id   0, thereby
achieving the lowest possible level of transaction costs.
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pegto be an optimum, we must also ensure that the second-order con-
dition for a maximum is satisﬁed. The condition ψr[ /(1 –  )]  1 –  is suﬃ-
cient (but not necessary) to satisfy the second-order condition for the gov-
ernment’s welfare maximization problem. Moreover, this condition implies
that W ˆ peg is globally concave in Ig; hence, the optimal solution, Ig
peg, is
unique. We omit a detailed statement of the proof because it follows simply
from diﬀerentiating  with respect to Ig. In what follows we shall restrict at-
tention to parameter ranges for which the second-order condition is satis-
ﬁed.
Of key interest to us is the behavior of the optimal domestic interest rate


















g     0,
since ∂ /∂Ig   0 (from the second-order condition for welfare maximiza-
tion) and ∂ /∂  0. We state this result in the following proposition.
P 2. The optimal domestic interest rate, Ig
peg, is independent of
the money demand parameter  . Hence, a negative money demand shock (a
fall in  ) or a positive money demand shock (a rise in  )leaves Ig
peg unchanged.
This proposition says that a social welfare–maximizing policy-maker,
who keeps the exchange rate ﬁxed by fully intervening in the foreign ex-
change market, should not alter the domestic interest rate in response to
money demand shocks. Intuitively, at an optimum, the marginal beneﬁt in
terms of reducing transaction costs, given by the last term on the RHS of
equation (52), is independent of  . There is therefore no reason for the op-
timal domestic interest rate to change. Because h ˆ  ( /2) – (Id/2B), a change
in   merely induces a corresponding parallel shift up or down in money de-
mand but leaves unchanged the marginal beneﬁt of changing the domestic
interest rate. Hence, both h ˆ and h fall in response to a negative money de-
mand shock.
The preceding analysis allows us to tie down the behavior of all the en-
dogenous variables in the model in response to a money demand shock. We
summarize them in the following proposition.
P 3. An unexpected fall (rise) in   causes real money balances
to fall (rise). The central bank responds to the shock by intervening in the for-
eign exchange market by selling (buying) international reserves in order to
keep the nominal exchange rate unchanged at the preshock level. The domes-
tic interest rate, Ig, is kept unchanged. Because neither the domestic interest
rate nor the exchange rate changes, output of both sectors remains unaﬀected.
Furthermore, real domestic credit increases (falls) whereas international re-
serves fall (increase).
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policy response involves elements of the four regimes described above.
Speciﬁcally, the fall in real money demand is accommodated fully through
foreign exchange market intervention (i.e., selling reserves), without any
change in the exchange rate, as would happen under a ﬁxed exchange rate.
In addition, the domestic interest rate is kept unchanged (i.e., monetary
policy is not tightened in response to the shock), as would occur under ei-
ther a pure or dirty ﬂoat. Finally, the optimal response also involves an in-
crease in real domestic credit, as would occur if policy makers were at-
tempting to (partially) sterilize the fall in real money demand.
It is worth stressing that the existence of nominal wage rigidities is key in
generating the result that the nominal exchange rate should be kept ﬁxed. In
the absence of nominal wage rigidities, exchange rate ﬂuctuations are cost-
less. In that event, the central bank has no incentive to intervene, which im-
plies that a pure ﬂoat is optimal.24,25
14.5 Costly Intervention
This section completes the speciﬁcation of the general model by incor-
porating costly intervention and derives the optimal policy response in such
a case. We proceed in two steps. We ﬁrst study the optimal policy contingent
on no intervention and then contingent on intervention; we then confront
the question of when it will be optimal for policy makers to intervene.
14.5.1 Optimal Policy under Intervention
As before, we analyze the eﬀects of a negative money demand shock. In
particular, starting from a steady state with   1, we study the eﬀects of an
unanticipated and permanent fall in  . To simplify notation, and without
loss of generality, we also choose initial conditions such that E     1 and 
R   0. For R   0, this corresponds to an initial situation in which Z   h– n.
To see this, one can rewrite the central bank balance sheet as E   Z  /(zb  
m – R). However, the commercial bank balance sheet implies that zb   h – 
m – n. Hence, for R   0, the expression for E reduces to
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24. In the absence of nominal wage rigidities, the policy maker is essentially indiﬀerent be-
tween intervening and not intervening, because allocations are independent of the level of the
exchange rate. However, even an inﬁnitesimal cost of intervening would imply that the optimal
policy is a pure ﬂoat.
25. We should note that the strict independence of the optimal interest rate from the money
demand shock is due to the quadratic transaction costs technology. In a more general setup for
transaction costs, say  υ(h ˆ), it is easy to show that the optimal response to a negative money
demand shock is to raise the domestic interest rate to partially oﬀset the eﬀect of the shock on
money demand. Hence, optimal policy, in general, would entail a combination of higher in-
terest rates and foreign exchange market intervention.Finally, we also assume that in the initial steady state the domestic interest
rate is given by the solution to the optimal policy problem under costless in-
tervention. Hence, I  g   Ig
peg, while n and h are given by their corresponding
levels under Ig
peg.
For simplicity, we assume that the central bank incurs a ﬁxed cost   0
in the event that it intervenes in the foreign exchange market. Moreover, this
ﬁxed cost is symmetric: it applies to either an increase or a decrease in the
stock of reserves.26 Clearly, if   0, the model reduces to the one analyzed
earlier in which the optimal response is to fully insulate the exchange rate
from all money shocks. Under this general speciﬁcation, the resource con-
straint for the economy now becomes




a)    pqt
    ct
y   pct
x   qt   (h ˆ2    h ˆ   κ)] e rtdt   0.
It is useful to begin by noting that, because the intervention cost is ﬁxed and
independent of the size of the intervention, there can only be two potential
outcomes to the policy maker’s problem. Either the monetary authority pays
the ﬁxed cost of intervention and intervenes by the full amount necessary to
keep the nominal exchange rate unchanged, or it does not intervene at all.27
In the event that the policy maker intervenes, optimal policy will coincide
with that under costless intervention (which was derived above). This fol-
lows from the fact that the cost of intervention is independent of the size of
intervention. Consequently, none of the marginal conditions for optimal
policy are aﬀected. The policy maker would thus respond to a negative
money demand shock by keeping the domestic interest rate and the nomi-
nal exchange rate unchanged. Money demand would therefore fall by the
full amount of the shock. Hence, under full intervention, output of both
sectors remains completely invariant to changes in  .
In this case, the representative household’s welfare is increasing in c – ζl   
( W ˆ I), which is given by
(55) W ˆ I   Brk0   Bl      ζl      B (pq    q)   B (h ˆ2    h ˆ   κ)   Br ,
where we have used the resource constraint (eq. [54]) to substitute out for c.
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26. We take this ﬁxed cost to be a highly heuristic representation of a world with asset mar-
ket segmentation in which agents must pay a ﬁxed cost to transfer money between the goods
market and the asset market, along the lines of Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (1999). Formal-
izing this channel is far from trivial (because the main exercise involves performing compara-
tive statics for the optimal policy) and is left for future research. See also Cadenillas and Zap-
atero (1999), who derive the optimal intervention policy for the central bank in a stochastic
model with a ﬁxed cost of intervention.
27. Note that partial intervention would imply that the exchange rate must change, which,
in turn, would imply output losses in sector y. Because these losses are costless to avoid
through an appropriate intervention (the ﬁxed cost implies that the marginal intervention is
costless), partial intervention can never be an optimal policy choice.In this case, the representative household’s welfare is increasing in c – ζl   
( W ˆ I), which is given by
(55) W ˆ I   Brk0   Bl      ζl      B (pq    q)   B (h ˆ2    h ˆ   κ)   Br ,
where we have used the resource constraint (eq. [54]) to substitute out for c.
The only diﬀerence between this expression and the RHS of equation (51)
is the cost of intervention term, Br ,w hich is independent of all endoge-
nous variables. This establishes our assertion that, if it is optimal to inter-
vene, optimal policy in this instance must coincide with optimal policy un-












    0,
where we have used the ﬁrst-order condition given by equation (10), the
money demand equation (13), and the fact that the optimal domestic inter-
est rate is independent of  . Thus, the smaller the money demand param-
eter   (i.e., the bigger the shock), the lower the welfare.
14.5.2 Optimal Policy under No Intervention
If the policy maker chooses not to pay the cost of intervention, then there
will be no intervention at all. Hence, reserves will remain unchanged in re-
sponse to the money demand shock. In this event, there emerges a role for
interest rate policy for domestic macroeconomic management. To see this,
consider the case in which the central bank reacts to the negative money de-
mand shock not only by not intervening but also by keeping domestic in-
terest rates unchanged. Money demand falls by the full amount of the
shock, whereas domestic loans (and, hence, sector-x output) remain un-
changed. With an unchanged nominal stock of government bonds, Z  , equa-
tion (53) implies that the nominal exchange rate must increase (because h
falls and ndoes not change). The nominal depreciation along with the nom-
inal wage rigidity implies a fall in the real wage. This causes a contraction
of labor supply and output of sector y, which returns to the steady-state
level only asymptotically.
Now suppose that the central bank raised the domestic interest rate mar-
ginally in response to the shock. This would lower loans while reducing the
fall in money demand. From equation (53) it is easy to see that, relative to
the previous case of unchanged interest rates, the nominal depreciation in-
duced by the shock must be smaller. Accordingly, the fall in the real wage
must also be smaller, which in turn implies a smaller contraction of sector
y. Of course, this beneﬁt comes at the cost of an output contraction in sec-
tor x, because the credit cost of the imported input is greater. It is clear,
however, that in choosing the optimal domestic interest rate policy makers
should be trading oﬀ these two margins.
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strictly increasing in c – ζ(ls)  (  W ˆ NI), which takes into account that, for
negative money demand shocks, actual employment equals labor supply;
that is, la   ls. In the event of no intervention, the economy’s resource con-
straint implies that
(57) W ˆ NI   Brk0   B (pq    q)   B (h ˆ2    h ˆ   κ)   rY,
where Y    0
  [B(lt
s)  – ζ(lt
s) ]e–rtdt is the present discounted value of sector-y
output net of the disutility from labor supply.
At this stage, it is easy to see that the optimal policy problem under in-
tervention becomes more complicated than in the costless intervention
case. The reason is that, in response to a depreciation of the currency, the
nominal wage rigidity implies that the economy displays intrinsic output
dynamics because the labor market goes into disequilibrium. In order to
make analytical progress, we simplify the model by setting   1 and   2.
These parameter values make both the production function of sector y and
the marginal disutility from labor supply linear in labor. This simpliﬁcation
allows us to compute the change in optimal policies even in the presence of
intrinsic output dynamics.
From equation (43), notice that, under linear production in sector y, the
equilibrium real wage is unity (i.e., w    1), which implies that the nominal
wage in the initial steady state must be unity as well. Hence, on impact, the
real wage is given by w 0   1/E0   1. Moreover, under negative money de-
mand shocks we are restricting attention to w 0 ∈ [0, 1]. From equation (53)
it follows that





Because h – n is increasing in Ig, it is obvious that the initial real wage is an
increasing function of the domestic interest rate. In particular, ∂w0/∂Ig  
(1/Z  ) [(1 –  )/2B2 – (∂n/∂Ig)]   0, whereas ∂2w0/∂(Ig)2   – (1/Z  )[∂2n/∂(Ig)2]  
0. Hence, the initial real wage is an increasing and concave function of the
domestic interest rate.
As shown above, an unexpected currency depreciation implies that labor
supply is the short end of the labor market. Hence, actual employment is
given by labor supply. Under our assumptions on   and  , the actual path
of employment, given by equation (48), reduces to
(59) lt
a   l  [1   (w 0   1)e  w0t].
Because employment and labor supply are linear in the initial real wage
while Y=   
0 [Blt
a– (lt
a)2]e–rtdt, one can differentiate Ywith respect to w0to get















2   [r   (1   w 0)]   0,
where we have used equations (9) and (59) to integrate out over t. For later
reference, it is useful to note that Y ww0 0   (Bl  /r2) (r    )   0 and Y ww0 1
  0. It is straightforward to check that Y ww   0 for w 0 ∈ [0, 1].
The policy choices at time zero are w 0 (  1/E0) and Ig. However, equation
(58) makes clear that only one of these two variables can be freely chosen.
We shall assume that the policy maker chooses Ig. Because Z   is given ex-
ogenously and R0   R    0, a given choice of Ig determines h and n. These
two variables allow us to uniquely determine w 0 from equation (58). More-
over, all private-sector behavior can be expressed as functions solely of E0
and Ig. Thus, the government’s problem can be formalized as choosing I0
g to
maximize the RHS of equation (57) subject to equations (13), (24), (31),
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In the following we shall denote the optimal interest rate for the no-
intervention case by Ig
NI. Speciﬁcally,  NII
g I
g
NI   0. Three results follow di-
rectly from the ﬁrst-order condition. First, for   1 the optimal domestic
interest rate continues to be Ig
peg. This can be seen from the fact that  NI   0
for Ig   Ig
peg and   1. Note that for Ig   Ig
peg and   1 we must have w 0  
1. Because Y ww0 1 0, the last term on the RHS of equation (61) drops out.
The result then follows from the fact that the ﬁrst two terms on the RHS are
merely dW ˆ peg/dIg, which is zero for Ig   Ig
peg (see eq. [52]). Hence, absent a
money demand shock, Ig
NI   Ig
peg.29
Second, for   1 and Ig   Ig
peg, it is easy to check that  NI   0. Thus, it is
optimal for the policy maker to respond to a negative money demand shock
by raising the domestic interest rate—that is, Ig
NI Ig
peg. Third, in the case of
  1, it is never optimal for the policy maker to raise the domestic interest
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28. It is important to note that we will only focus on values of ψ for which there are interior
solutions when   1. In general, however, there will be corner solutions. In fact, it is easy to
show that, for ψ   0 and   1, there will be a corner solution at the Ig corresponding to the
Friedman rule (i.e., Id 0). The intuition is clear: If ψ 0 and   1, “increasing” Ig(if it were
possible) above the Friedman rule would have no ﬁrst-order eﬀects on transactions costs but
would have a ﬁrst-order positive eﬀect on sector-y output as the currency appreciates (i.e.,  NI
  0, when evaluated at Id   0 for ψ   0 and   1). By continuity, therefore, there will also be
corner solutions for very small values of ψ. For larger values of ψ, interior solutions exist (as
we have established using numerical examples).
29. As in the case of costless intervention studied earlier, it can be shown that the condition
ψr[ /(1 –  )]   1 –   continues to be suﬃcient (but not necessary) to satisfy the second-order
condition.rate all the way to the point that w 0   E0   1. Because Y ww0 1   0, this fol-
lows from equation (52), which says that the sum of the ﬁrst two terms on
the RHS of equation (61) is negative for Ig   Ig
peg.
Let us now turn to the relationship between the optimal domestic inter-
est rate and the size of the money demand shock. To determine this, we start
by noting that, from the implicit function theorem, dIg




NI   0 from the second-order condition, it follows that the signs
of dIg
NI/d  and   
NI are the same. Partially diﬀerentiating equation (61) with
respect to   gives   







NI      0,
which says that the optimal domestic interest rate increases with the size of
the shock (i.e., the smaller the value of  , and hence the larger the shock, the
higher the value of Ig
NI).
The next issue of interest is the behavior of the nominal exchange rate as a
function of the money demand shock. This is not immediately obvious, be-
cause there are two potentially oﬀsetting eﬀects. A fall in   directly reduces
money demand and thus, all else being equal, reduces the real wage by in-
creasing E. (Recall that w 0 1/E0 (h– n)/Z  ). However, the fact that the cen-
tral bank raises interest rates in response to a bigger money demand shock im-
plies that, for a given  , money demand rises, which appreciates the currency
and raises w 0. If the latter eﬀect is strong enough, then the nominal exchange
rate will fall (i.e., the currency would appreciate) in response to larger shocks.











NI    Ig





0   
2 ,
where  Ig
NI is the partial derivative of equation (61) with respect to Ig. As
noted above, ψr[ /(1 –  )]   1 –   is a suﬃcient condition to satisfy the sec-
ond-order condition for welfare maximization (i.e.,  Ig
NI   0). It is straight-
forward to check that this suﬃciency condition is also a suﬃcient condition
for  Ig
NI   rY ww (∂w 0/∂Ig)2.30 Hence, ψr[ /(1 –  )]   1 –   is a suﬃcient condi-
tion for dw 0/d  0, which implies that as  becomes smaller (i.e., the money
demand shock gets larger), the initial real wage, w 0, becomes progressively
smaller. Because E0 1/w 0, this implies that, with no intervention, the nom-
(r/2BZ  )(∂w 0/∂Ig)Y ww    
  Ig
NI
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30. To see this, deﬁne N   pq  – q. Hence,  NI   B(∂N/∂Ig)   [(1 –  )/2B]Id   rY w(∂w 0/∂Ig)
and  NI
I
g   B[∂2N/∂(Ig)2] – (1 –  )2/2B   rY ww(∂w 0/∂Ig)2   rY w[∂2w 0/∂(Ig)2]. Moreover,  NI
I
g –
rY ww(∂w 0/∂Ig)2   B[∂2N/∂(Ig)2] – (1 –  )2/2B   rY w[∂2w 0/∂(Ig)2]. Because Y ww and ∂2w 0/∂(Ig)2 are
both negative, a suﬃcient condition for both  NI
I
g   0 and  NI
I
g   rY ww(∂w 0/∂Ig)2 is ∂2N/∂(Ig)2  
0. It is easy to check that ∂2N/∂(Ig)2   0 for ψr[ /(1 –  )]   1 –  .inal exchange rate is a decreasing function of  ; that is, the larger the nega-
tive money demand shock, the larger the currency depreciation.
Finally, it is useful to characterize the welfare eﬀect of a negative money
demand shock under the no-intervention regime. Totally diﬀerentiating















  Y w   0,
where we have used the fact that, at an optimum, the ﬁrst-order condition
for welfare maximization (eq. [61]) says that (∂W ˆ NI/∂Ig)(∂Ig
NI/∂ )   0. We
collect these results in the following proposition.
P4. Under no foreign exchange market intervention, the central
bank responds to a negative money demand shock by raising the domestic in-
terest rate while allowing some currency depreciation to occur. Moreover, the
larger the negative money demand shock, the larger the increase in the optimal
domestic interest rate, the larger the currency depreciation, and the larger the
fall in welfare.
14.5.3 To Intervene or Not To Intervene
Having described the behavior of optimal interest rate policy contingent
on the intervention regime (i.e., intervention or no intervention), we now
turn to the determination of the optimal intervention regime itself. For a
given  , it is straightforward to see that the optimal intervention strategy is
determined by
Do not intervene if W ˆ NII
g I
g




Intervene if W ˆ NII
g I
g




Notice ﬁrst that around   1, W ˆ NI – W ˆ I   Br . This follows from the
facts that for   1, Ig
NI II
g Ig
pegand w 0 1, whereas ls la l  . Intuitively,
around   1, the only diﬀerence between the two regimes is the cost of in-
tervention, whereas the nominal exchange rate and the domestic interest
rates are identical. Consequently, welfare under intervention is lower.
From equations (56) and (63), it is also easy to see that (dW ˆ NI/d )–
(dW ˆ I/d )   (r/2BZ  )Y w   0. This indicates that although bigger money de-
mand shocks (or lower  ’s) cause welfare to decline under both regimes (as
indicated by eq. [56] and [63]), welfare under the no-intervention regime
falls faster than under the full intervention regime. Intuitively, the direct
eﬀect of the money demand shock on transaction costs is the same under
the two regimes. However, under the no-intervention regime, a smaller  
leads to a lower real wage due to the nominal wage rigidity, which extracts
an output cost from sector y.
The preceding implies that the relative welfare comparison between the
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and the output cost associated with not intervening. Crucially, the output
costs under the no-intervention regime increase as the shock grows bigger,
but the corresponding cost of intervention is independent of the size of the
shock. Hence, the welfare diﬀerential between the two regimes shifts in fa-
vor of intervention as the shock grows larger. Because W ˆ NI – W ˆ I   Br   0
around   1, this implies that for a given   there must exist a threshold
value of  ,   ˆ   1, such that W ˆ NI    ˆ   W ˆ I    ˆ. Further, for all     ˆw e
must have W ˆ NI W ˆ I. These features of the optimal policy problem are cap-
tured in ﬁgure 14.1, which depicts welfare under the two regimes as a func-
tion of 1/ , so that moving to the right along the horizontal axis implies a
larger shock (i.e., a smaller value of  ).
Using the above results, one can now completely characterize the optimal
policy response to money demand shocks (see table 14.2). For small money
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Fig. 14.1 Welfare comparison
Fig. 14.2 Optimal exchange rate demand shocks—that is,   ∈ (  ˆ, 1)—it is optimal for the policy maker not
to intervene but rather let the currency ﬂoat and raise the domestic interest
rate to ﬁght the currency depreciation in order to reduce the resulting out-
put cost. As we saw earlier, this also implies that in this range, the larger the
money demand shock, the bigger the currency depreciation. However, for
large money demand shocks, (i.e.,     ˆ), it is optimal for the policy maker
to keep domestic interest rates unchanged and intervene fully in order to
prevent the nominal exchange rate from ﬂuctuating at all. Figure 14.2 de-
picts the behavior of the nominal exchange rate as a function of 1/ . For
small shocks (i.e., 1/  1/  ˆ) the exchange rate is an increasing function of
the shock, whereas for large shocks (i.e., 1/  1/  ˆ) the exchange rate re-
mains ﬁxed (relative to the preshock equilibrium).
The last result worth noting is that the threshold value of the shock pa-
rameter,   ˆ, is a decreasing function of the ﬁxed cost of intervention,  . This
result follows from noting that (dW ˆ NI/d )–  ( dW ˆ I/d )   (r/2BZ  ))Y w is inde-
pendent of  . However, a smaller  implies that W ˆ NI– W ˆ I Br is smaller.
In terms of ﬁgure 14.1, a smaller   causes a parallel shift upward of the 
W ˆ I schedule, leaving its slope with respect to   unaﬀected. Hence, the
threshold   ˆm ust be larger (i.e., it must be closer to unity). When   0,
the two schedules coincide for   1, with W ˆ I exceeding W ˆ NI for all   1.
We summarize the preceding results in the following proposition.
P 5. The optimal policy response to a negative money demand
shock is a function of the size of the shock. For small shocks, it is optimal for
the policy maker not to intervene in the foreign exchange market but instead
to raise the domestic interest rate and let the currency depreciate. Moreover,
in this range, the larger the shock, the higher both the nominal exchange rate
and the domestic interest rate. For large shocks, however, it is optimal for the
central bank to intervene by the full amount necessary to keep the exchange
rate and domestic interest rates unchanged. Furthermore, the smaller the ﬁxed
cost of intervention, the smaller the threshold size of the shock for which the
full intervention policy becomes optimal.
To assess how well the model might explain the key stylized facts outlined
in the introduction, let us perform the following conceptual experiment.
Suppose that this economy were subject to a sequence of (stochastic) mon-
etary shocks. Assume, further, that developing countries were hit, on aver-
age, by larger shocks than industrial countries. The outcome would be a se-
ries of changes in the endogenous policy variables, as captured by the last
two rows in table 14.2. From a cross-sectional point of view, the model
would predict that developing countries (which face mostly large shocks)
would exhibit low exchange rate variability and high reserve variability,
whereas developed countries (which face mostly small shocks) would ex-
hibit high exchange rate variability and low reserve variability. From a time-
series perspective, we would observe an average response (because coun-
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ative monetary shocks) of falling reserves, a more depreciated currency, and
higher interest rates. Hence, the correlation between changes in the ex-
change rate and interest rates would be positive, but the correlation between
(a) reserves and the exchange rate and (b) reserves and interest rates would
be negative. All these predictions match the stylized policy facts described
in the introduction.
14.6 Conclusions
The starting point for this paper has been the observation that, in spite of
suﬀering larger shocks, developing countries (classiﬁed as ﬂoaters or man-
aged ﬂoaters) exhibit lower exchange rate variability and higher reserve
variability than developed countries which ﬂoat. This extreme “fear of
ﬂoating” is puzzling because, even if nominal exchange rate ﬂuctuations
were costly, one would still expect that larger shocks would lead to larger
changes in the nominal exchange rate.
This paper has developed a simple and highly stylized theoretical model
that is capable of explaining this puzzle. In particular, the model predicts
that for small negative money shocks, policy makers ﬁnd it optimal to let the
exchange rate adjust while partly oﬀsetting the shock by raising domestic
interest rates. For large shocks, however, policy makers ﬁnd it optimal to
completely stabilize the exchange rate by intervening in the foreign ex-
change market. The model thus predicts a nonmonotonic relationship be-
tween the nominal exchange rate and the size of the shock. If we identify
small shocks with developed countries and large shocks with developing
countries, the model predicts that developing countries should exhibit low
exchange rate variability and high reserve variability, whereas the converse
is true for developed countries.
While we view this as a useful ﬁrst step toward an understanding of the
“fear of ﬂoating” puzzle, there are at least two directions in which this line
of research should be taken. To begin with, we would like to endogenize the
fixed cost of intervention, which is of course key to our results. A natural av-
enue for doing this would be to consider a setup with asset market segmen-
tation along the lines of Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (1999). Although this
would be a major undertaking (given that our focus is on optimal policies,
which makes the problem already much more complicated from a for-
mal point of view), it would certainly be worthwhile to pursue. Second, it
would be useful to develop a stochastic version of this model, calibrate it
for some representative developing country, and try to match the observed cor-
relations. Developing richer models along these lines should prove ex-
tremely useful both for understanding the actual responses observed in the
data and for devising implementable and usable policy rules for central
bankers.
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Comment Eduardo Borensztein
This paper by Lahiri and Végh (LV) takes an interesting ﬁrst step in ad-
dressing a very important question, one frequently met when designing
monetary or exchange rate policies in emerging markets today. The ques-
tion is how to respond to a capital outﬂow, or “exchange market pressure,”
in an economy with a managed ﬂoating exchange rate and an active inter-
est in what happens to the exchange rate. The model is nicely done and
clearly presented, but there are some modeling strategy decisions in the
monetary and ﬁnancial area that I do not entirely like.
I like to represent the policy options in a triangle, as in the ﬁgure. In the
diagram, as we move down, the central bank is intervening more in the for-
eign exchange market and dampening any adjustment in the exchange rate,
perhaps preventing a large depreciation when the country suﬀers a cutback
in external ﬁnancing or an outﬂow of capital.
At the top vertex of the triangle, we are in a clean ﬂoat, with no central
bank intervention at any time. Along the bottom of the triangle, the ex-
change rate is completely ﬁxed, and the adjustment to a negative external
shock comes fully through a loss in international reserves. However, here
there is another dimension of policies, namely the extent to which the cen-
tral bank sterilizes the monetary eﬀect of a loss in reserves by creating do-
mestic credit. At one extreme there is no attempt to sterilize, and the fall in
reserves is fully reﬂected in the monetary base (and in domestic interest
rates). In this vertex, the central bank would be operating as a (textbook)
currency board. At the other extreme, the central bank completely sterilizes
the monetary impact of its intervention in the foreign exchange market, al-
lowing domestic monetary conditions to remain undisturbed.
Suppose there is a shock to external ﬁnancing, say because of contagion.
Which point in this triangle is it optimal to choose? Intuition would suggest
some interior point in the triangle, avoiding the ﬁnancial-sector distress
that can come from excessive depreciation or too high interest rates and the
ﬁscal implications of, and perhaps also market constraints on, sterilized in-
tervention on a large scale.1 LV, while not intentionally attempting to rep-
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1. This implicitly ignores arguments about the institutional strength or credibility of a
legally established regime such as a currency board. resent the above story, ﬁnd that countries should choose an interior point in
the triangle, at least for large shocks.
The results in LV can be easily summarized. In what concerns the extent
of exchange rate ﬂexibility (the choice along the vertical direction in the di-
agram) in the basic framework with wage rigidity but no cost of foreign ex-
change intervention, traditional results apply: for monetary shocks, a con-
stant exchange rate is superior, and for real shocks the opposite
holds—namely, a full adjustment in the exchange rate is preferable. The ba-
sic reason is that, in each case, those are the regimes that will allow real
wages to stay at or near their equilibrium levels. LV then introduce a ﬁxed
cost to foreign exchange market intervention by the central bank. With this
cost, the optimal response to a shock to a somewhat idiosyncratic money
demand (more on this later) depends on the size of the shock. For small
changes, the cost of intervention is too high, and it is preferable to let the ex-
change rate adjust fully. For suﬃciently large shocks to money demand,
however, it is optimal to intervene, and we return to the standard result of
keeping the exchange rate ﬁxed and using reserves to the full extent neces-
sary.
The main weakness that I ﬁnd in the LV framework is that all the relevant
domestic interest rates (on bank deposits and loans and on government
bonds) are not related to the international interest rate, the expected depre-
ciation of the exchange rate, or the country risk premium because they cor-
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Fig. 14C.1 Response to exchange market pressurerespond to assets that are “nontraded” by assumption. That is, the kind of
transactions that individuals, ﬁrms, and the government can perform pre-
clude any competition between domestic and foreign ﬁnancial assets. Al-
though I understand that the model would become too complicated if these
assets were “traded,” I would happily give up the careful, ﬁrst-principles, in-
ﬁnite-horizon detail in the consumer and real sectors in exchange for a less
crude ﬁnancial-sector framework. Particularly when considering the ap-
parent puzzle of limited exchange rate variability in emerging-market
economies, as this paper sets out to do, it seems important to try to incor-
porate the reaction of the central bank to changes in country risk, credibil-
ity, and the like.
Money demand is also special. It is the demand for an interest-bearing
demand deposit used for transactions, and thus it depends positively on the
interest rate. It is somewhat diﬃcult to interpret money demand shocks in
this framework. Do they approximate a “capital outﬂow” that is reversed
when domestic interest rates increase? The framework also does not permit
diﬀerentiation between money demand and “bond demand,” that is, be-
tween liquidity conditions and the demand for government and private lia-
bilities that reﬂects considerations of risk premium and so on. Once again,
in view of the exchange rate variability puzzle that motivates the paper, it is
not clear how relevant these LV money demand shocks are in explaining the
contrast between emerging markets and advanced economies in their man-
agement of exchange rates.
As concerns the extent of sterilization of the monetary impact of changes
in international reserves (the choice along the horizontal direction of the
triangle), the results are less easy to interpret. It is not entirely clear what
sterilization of a money demand shock should mean. Central banks steril-
ize to avoid the monetary impact of a change in reserves generated by some
current account or capital account shock. However, the shock considered
in the paper originates in domestic monetary and ﬁnancial markets them-
selves. In any event, when the optimal policy involves foreign exchange mar-
ket intervention by the central bank, it also involves expanding domestic
credit so that domestic interest rates remain constant. LV deﬁne a “fully
sterilized intervention” policy as one that always keeps the real quantity of
money constant, which seems appropriate in general. For this particular
shock, however, the optimal policy comes close to what one could think of
as full sterilization, keeping interest rates and the level of bank loans con-
stant, although the level of deposits (money demand) declines.
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Sebastian Edwards commented on the policy options that a country may
choose from when facing external shocks. The optimal policy is probably
some combination of the three instruments—higher interest rates, steril-
ized intervention, and exchange rate ﬂexibility—inside the “triangle” that
Eduardo Borensztein showed. Roberto Chang and Andrés Velasco’s paper
derives formally a similar result, but Edwards was concerned with how use-
ful this type of result is to policy makers. Drawing on the recent experience
of Mexico, he proposed to analyze the trigger strategy for interest rate in-
tervention. The Mexican authorities selected the upper corner of the trian-
gle and are ﬂoating the exchange rate without using any other policy most
of the time. However, when shocks surpass some threshold, that triggers the
use of another policy, namely, interest rate intervention. This policy ar-
rangement is highly asymmetrical, but it has worked. For example, when
peso intraday trading against the dollar reached 11 in September 1998, the
authorities increased the interest rate to about 55 percent and suspended
the CETES auction. When things calmed down, however, they stopped us-
ing interest rate policy and returned to the corner of ﬂoating the exchange
rate. The question to those at the table was what the likelihood is of gener-
ating this kind of model and evaluating this kind of policy. This is what pol-
icy makers are looking for.
Federico Sturzenegger made the remark that in the model any change of
interest rates will lead to a loss of output, which leads to a bias toward ﬁxed
exchange rates. To circumvent this eﬀect, the model then imposes the un-
natural cost of intervention. An alternative method would be to allow for
the beneﬁts from a ﬂexible exchange rate, which is a much more plausible
speciﬁcation.
Jaume Ventura commented on the way the model generates a fear-of-
ﬂoating exchange rate through nominal wage rigidity. The standard Fried-
man argument is that when there is nominal wage rigidity, there is a fear of
ﬁxed rates, and the exchange rate must equate the labor market. Thus, if one
thinks that most shocks to an economy aﬀect labor demand and labor
supply, then the ﬂoating exchange rate is really better, because it can be used
to keep the real wage at the level where it should be. This is true in the model,
but the paper focuses on discussing the eﬀects of a shock to money demand,
which is why things are reversed. Because real wage should never change,
one should avoid as much as possible a change in the exchange rate. There
are two problems. First, one has to make an assessment of the kinds of
shocks an economy goes through: are most shocks hitting the labor market
or money demand? Depending on the answer, one can choose one policy or
another. Second, even if the shocks to money demand are very important,
one wants to ﬁx the interest rate, as most standard results suggest. This is
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ever, if sterilization is not very costly, then nominal wage rigidity cannot be
a convincing channel to create the fear of ﬂoating.
Alejandro M. Werner said that central bankers who ﬂoat their currencies
and use interest rate policy are not concerned with money demand
shocks—they can always adjust money supply at a given interest rate. Thus,
the important shocks to the monetary authorities are real shocks and port-
folio shocks.
Enrique G. Mendoza raised this question: how strong is the assumption
that domestically issued bonds cannot be traded? He also commented on
the assumption that ﬁrms use credit from the banking system to buy im-
ports, and asked whether similar results would hold if ﬁrms could use for-
eign loans instead.
Amartya Lahiri agreed that the paper took an extreme stand on the va-
lidity of interest rate policy; however, he said, other approaches (for ex-
ample, Flood and Ventura’s portfolio model approach) lead to similar re-
sults. The key feature is how the risk premium between the domestic and
foreign interest rates changes with policies. He said that other modeling
strategies are feasible and can handle the sterilization interventions, which
they are working on.
Lahiri also agreed with Ventura that in the case of a real shock, one
should allow the exchange rate to ﬂoat. The authors plan to calibrate both
monetary and real shocks and determine whether the model can produce
the moments that they ﬁnd in the data on exchange rate and interest rate
ﬂuctuations.
He also said that the paper focused on money demand shocks because
this was the easiest way to create an environment with a capital outﬂow and
a depreciation pressure on the currency. He asked the audience not to take
this aspect of the model very seriously.
Carlos A. Végh agreed with discussant Borensztein that the optimal pol-
icy choice should lie inside the triangle. He said that the model could be eas-
ily generalized (by introducing imperfect substitutability between domestic
and foreign assets) to have this result. On the issue of monetary shocks, he
pointed out that in this model shocks to money demand should be inter-
preted as portfolio shocks because the monetary aggregate in the model is
in the spirit of saving accounts.
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